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Can Cost-Benefit Analysis Help  
Consumer Protection Laws?  
Or at Least Benefit Analysis? 
Jeff Sovern* 
Cost-benefit analysis is often troubling to consumer advocates. But 
this Article argues that in some circumstances it may help consumers. The 
Article gives several examples of supposed consumer protections that have 
protected consumers poorly, if at all. It also argues that before adopting 
consumer protections, lawmakers should first attempt to determine whether 
the protections will work. The Article suggests that because lawmakers are 
unlikely to adopt multiple solutions to the same problem, one cost of 
ineffective consumer protections is a kind of opportunity cost, in that 
ineffective consumer protections might appear to make adoption of effective 
ones unnecessary. Ironically, such an opportunity cost is unlikely to be 
taken account of in cost-benefit analysis. Among the protections that 
especially risk failing to benefit consumers are laws that require consumers 
to perform certain tasks, such as disclosure laws that presuppose consumers 
will pay attention to and act on the disclosures; if consumers instead 
generally ignore the disclosures, the consumer protection will be largely 
illusory. Accordingly, before adopting measures that depend on consumers 
to do something, lawmakers should try to verify that consumers would in 
fact undertake those actions. The Article also makes some suggestions for 
ascertaining whether consumer protections will work (i.e., benefit 
consumers) and concludes with a brief critique of the proposed Independent 
Agency Regulatory Analysis Act. 
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Sechooler) of the UC Irvine Law Review symposium titled “The Costs and Benefits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis” at which I presented a version of this Article, and Professor Katherine Porter for the 
invitation to do so.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We are all consumers and so would benefit from well-crafted consumer 
protections. On the other hand, consumer protections that impose costs 
disproportionate to their benefits or that fail to produce benefits seem 
undesirable. Accordingly, some advocate using cost-benefit analysis to analyze 
proposed consumer protections. For example, the proposed Independent Agency 
Regulatory Analysis Act would require certain independent consumer protection 
agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis and to have the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs review those analyses. 
For several reasons, consumer advocates often oppose cost-benefit analysis.1 
First, the benefits of consumer protections are frequently difficult to quantify. 
How, for example, can the benefits of privacy rules that prevent people from 
knowing your purchasing practices be measured?2 This difficulty makes it hard to 
argue that the benefits of privacy protections exceed the costs of those 
protections. Second, cost-benefit analysis often delays the adoption of rules, and 
during that interval, consumers lack needed protections.3 Third, requirements that 
rules pass muster under cost-benefit analysis can lead to litigation challenging the 
 
1. Cost-benefit analysis has been defined as the “systematic identification of all of the costs 
and benefits associated with a forthcoming regulation, including nonquantitative and indirect costs 
and benefits, and how those costs and benefits are distributed across different groups in society.” 
CURTIS W. COPELAND, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (2011). Commentators have called it “the official creed of the executive 
branch.” See generally Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002). 
2. See discussion infra Part I.D and notes 102–103 and accompanying text.  
3. See, e.g., Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A22 (noting that seventy-
two draft rules had been under review for longer than the ninety days specified by executive order; 
thirty-eight had been under consideration for more than a year; and three had been languishing since 
2010); Letter from Rachel Weintraub et al., Consumer Fed’n of Am. to Sen. Joseph Lieberman & Sen. 
Susan Collins (Nov. 2, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/news/610; Ben Peck, Impact of 
the Independent Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 3468: Further Delaying Needed Safeguards for Our Economy, DEMOS 
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/impact-independent-regulatory-analysis-act-s 
-3468-further-delaying-needed-safeguards-our. 
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rules, which can in turn lead to additional delay and even invalidation of the rules.4 
Indeed, consumer advocates may view cost-benefit analysis as a pretext used by 
those who oppose consumer protection and wish their opposition to sound more 
neutral.5 
To the extent that cost-benefit analysis requires matching costs against 
benefits, I share this skepticism. But to the extent that cost-benefit analysis 
requires those proposing consumer protections to try to demonstrate that those 
protections will benefit consumers, even if those benefits cannot be quantified 
precisely, it may have value. That is because lawmakers have sometimes adopted 
consumer protections that have not conferred the intended benefits upon 
consumers.6 
Even if purported consumer protections do not benefit consumers, some 
 
4. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Silla Brush, U.S. 
Regulators ‘Paralyzed’ by Cost-Benefit Suits, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-08/u-s-regulators-paralyzed-by-cost-benefit-suits-chilton-says.html 
(“‘Some regulators live in constant fear and are virtually paralyzed by the threat’ that they will face 
‘spuriously’ filed suits alleging that the costs and benefits of their rules weren’t adequately considered, 
[Commodity Futures Trading Commissioner Bart] Chilton said . . . .”). See generally Bruce Kraus & 
Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2013). Critics 
of the Independent Regulatory Agency Analysis Act, see Peck, supra note 3 and accompanying text, 
also charged that the bill would undermine the independence of regulatory agencies by subjecting 
their decisions to cost-benefit review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, see, e.g., 
Letter from Ams. for Fin. Reform to Senator (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://ourfinancialsecurity 
.org/blogs/wp-content/ourfinancialsecurity.org/uploads/2012/09/AFR-Oppose-S.-3468-9-6-12.pdf; 
Letter from Rachel Weintraub et al., supra note 3; Noah H. Sachs, Don’t Undercut Consumer Financial 
Protection Agencies’ Independence . . ., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2012, http:// 
www.timesdispatch.com/opinion/their-opinion/sachs-don-t-undercut-consumer-financial-protection 
-agencies-independence/article_bee1a54a-3759-11e2-afe3-001a4bcf6878.html.  
5. See Editorial, Senate Confronts a Sleazy Stealth Attack on Financial Regulation, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the 
-platform/editorial-senate-confronts-a-sleazy-stealth-attack-on-financial-regulation/article_83231246 
-fc2a-5419-8387-2148d0c6161c.html (quoting Lisa Donner, executive director of Americans for 
Financial Reform, as calling the bill subjecting regulatory agency rules to cost-benefit analysis “a 
sideways attack on Dodd-Frank”); Letter from Ams. for Fin. Reform, supra note 4 (“[T]his legislation 
would give Wall Street lobbyists another powerful set of tools to delay and derail the implementation 
of financial safeguards that are needed to protect our economy.”); Letter from Rachel Weintraub et 
al., supra note 3 (asserting that the cost-benefit analysis proposal would give “deep-pocketed 
opponents of . . . reforms yet another way to derail them”). Advocates of cost-benefit analysis are 
aware of this criticism. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 12 (“According to some skeptics, the 
antonym of cost-benefit analysis is not the unguided stab in the dark, but regulatory protection 
itself.”). Such a pretext may be behind a letter by Representatives Randy Neugebauer and Shelley 
Moore Capito to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Director Richard Cordray, dated 
March 29, 2012, requesting “assurance[s] that the CFPB will conduct rigorous, transparent cost-
benefit analysis whenever it drafts a new rule.” Letter from Rep. Randy Neugebauer & Rep. Shelley 
Moore Capito to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Mar. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinancelawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/157/2012/04/Cordray-letter 
.pdf. Both voted against the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the CFPB. See OFFICE OF THE CLERK, 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 413, WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2009 ( June 30, 2010), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll413.xml. 
6. See infra Part I. 
           
1244 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1241 
may see such protections as not worth arguing about if their costs are low. But 
that overlooks something in the nature of an opportunity cost in ineffective 
consumer protections. If consumer protections are ineffective, then the problems 
they are intended to solve remain. If policymakers believe the problems are solved 
by their chosen reform, then they may eschew other more effective ways of 
addressing the problems. Consequently, ineffective consumer protections not only 
impose costs, they also reduce the likelihood that the underlying problem will be 
cured another way. An irony is that this cost is unlikely to be taken into account in 
performing a cost-benefit analysis of consumer protections, even though it may be 
more significant than the costs that are considered.7 
Why would consumer protections fail? One reason is that lawmakers 
sometimes adopt consumer protection laws without determining whether 
consumers will actually use them. While some consumer protection laws help 
consumers even if consumers are unaware of them,8 others depend on consumer 
actions for their effectiveness, and if consumers do not take these actions, then 
the protections do not work. This is often true of disclosures, which typically 
require consumers to read and act on the information disclosed.9 Accordingly, to 
the extent that cost-benefit analysis examines whether consumers will actually use 
consumer protection rules, cost-benefit analysis may improve consumer 
protection. Otherwise, consumer protection regulation may be no more than the 
 
7. Richard Craswell refers to something analogous in the disclosure situation when he argues 
that mandated disclosures risk what he terms an “interference cost” in that they may crowd out 
“other information that would itself be useful to consumers.” Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic 
Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 348 (2013). 
8. Prohibitions on conduct, such as requirements that debt collectors refrain from lying to 
consumers, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012), or that businesses not employ bait and switch tactics, N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-o (McKinney 2012), do not require consumer participation to be effective.  
9. See, e.g., infra notes 16, 71 and accompanying text. Not all disclosures suffer from this 
disability. For example, some localities, including Los Angeles, COUNTY OF L.A., CAL., TITLE 8 
CONSUMER PROTECTION & BUSINESS REGULATION § 8.04.225 (2014), available at https:// 
library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16274; New York, N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE art. 81 
§ 81.51 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/health-code.shtml; San Diego, 
SAN DIEGO, CAL., COUNTY CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDINANCES § 61.107 (2014), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sandiegoco_ca
_mc; and the State of South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-25(L) (West, Westlaw through State 
Reg. Vol. 38, Issue 9, eff. Sept. 26, 2014), now require restaurants to post health department grades at 
their entrances. Some studies have shown that even consumers who ignore the disclosures have been 
aided by them because restaurateurs, not wishing poor grades on their doors, have improved 
restaurant hygiene, resulting in lower hospitalization rates for food-borne illness. See, e.g., L.A. CNTY. 
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, 10-YEAR REVIEW OF RESTAURANT AND FOOD FACILITY GRADING 
PROGRAM 4 (2008), available at http://file.lacounty.gov/bc/q1_2008/cms1_082885.pdf; Michael M. 
Grynbaum, In Reprieve for Restaurant Industry, New York Proposes Changes to Grading System, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2014, at A15 (reporting a fourteen percent decline in salmonella cases since adoption of 
restaurant grading in New York City). But see Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and 
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 643–46 (2012) (reporting that New York City’s restaurant 
grades did not improve consumer health, as measured by calls to 311 and Google searches for food 
poisoning and restaurant sanitation complaints).  
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“stab in the dark” that cost-benefit analysis advocates claim cost-benefit analysis 
avoids.10 
Part I of this Article gives four examples of consumer protection laws that 
consumers seem not to use sufficiently to accomplish the intended goals. Part II 
mentions a few ideas for increasing the likelihood that policymakers adopt rules 
that confer benefits upon consumers, while Part III offers comments on the 
proposed Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, which would subject 
decisions by independent administrative agencies, including the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (the Bureau or CFPB)—all of which regulate 
consumer transactions—to cost-benefit analysis review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs. 
I. CONSUMER PROTECTIONS THAT CONSUMERS DID NOT USE  
SUFFICIENTLY TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
A. Truth in Lending Act Mortgage Disclosures 
While many factors contributed to the Great Recession, one of its chief 
causes was that millions of consumers took out mortgages on which they later 
defaulted.11 Many of those mortgages have been foreclosed upon or may yet be.12 
Many of the defaulting consumers later claimed that they did not know what their 
payment obligations would be.13 Yet all those borrowers undoubtedly received the 
 
10. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 8.  
11. As of January 2011, nearly four million homes had been foreclosed upon and millions 
more consumers were delinquent on their mortgage payments. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 
Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv 
(2011). According to the QUARTERLY REVIEW issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
from the first quarter of 2011 through the first quarter of 2013, an additional 2,388,000 foreclosures 
occurred. See, e.g., Rajashri Chakrabarti et al., Household Debt and Saving During the 2007 Recession, 482 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 1, 6 (2011); Andrew Haughwout et al., The Supply Side of the Housing Boom and 
Bust of the 2000s, 556 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 1, 10 (2012); see also Mark Adelson, The Deeper Causes of the 
Financial Crisis: Mortgages Alone Cannot Explain It, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 2013, at 16, 22 
(“Together with the four millions loans that went through foreclosure during the crisis, a sum of 
between 8 million and 12 million mortgages, or between 15 percent and 25 percent of the original 
48.7 million [mortgage] loans [outstanding], will default or have already defaulted.”). 
12. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 11, at xv–xxviii. 
13. See, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & PROF’L REGULATION, FINDINGS FROM THE HB 4050 
PREDATORY LENDING DATABASE PILOT PROGRAM 3–4 (2007), available at http://nlihc.org 
/sites/default/files/SIRR-IL-2007.pdf (reporting that consumers with adjustable-rate loans believed 
they had secured fixed-rate loans); Rick Brundrett, How Mounting Loans Devastated 87-Year-Old, STATE 
(SC), Feb. 24, 2002, available at NewsBank, Rec. 0202240092 (last visited July 20, 2014); Bob Herbert, 
Op-Ed., A Swarm of Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A23 (“[P]redatory lenders have . . . 
pushed overpriced loans and outlandish fees on hapless victims who didn’t understand—and could 
not possibly have met—the terms of the contracts they signed. . . . A lawyer, William Spielberger, . . . 
said [mortgage originators] . . . were fully aware that the two women did not know what they were 
getting into.”); Bob Herbert, Editorial, Lost in a Flood of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A17 (“To 
this day Ms. Levey does not understand what she and her husband of more than half a century had 
agreed to. The terms might as well have been written in Sanskrit. . . . I heard the same story again and 
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disclosure statements required under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).14 While 
TILA has been said to have a number of purposes, its principal goal was to 
provide for “meaningful” disclosure of loan terms to consumers.15 How can it be 
that this consumer protection device so failed consumers? 
The answer seems to have two parts. The first part can be seen in the results 
of a 2009 survey of mortgage brokers about how consumers used the TILA 
mortgage disclosures.16 What the brokers said raises serious doubts about how 
much consumers use the TILA disclosures. The survey asked specifically about 
the final TILA disclosures, which were provided no later than at the closing of the 
loan during the years leading to the Great Recession.17 The final TILA disclosures 
 
again—decent people enticed, sometimes fraudulently, into loans they never understood and couldn’t 
afford.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Looking for the Lenders’ Little Helpers, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at 
BU1 (reporting that borrowers allege that a lender promised fixed-rate loan when loan was actually 
adjustable, something borrowers did not discover until two years later; initial monthly payments 
consumed forty-five percent of borrowers’ income and later rose); Carolyn Said, Living the American 
Nightmare, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 2007, at A1; Carolyn Said, Mortgage Meltdown: Plenty of Blame for Lending 
Mess, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008, at C1 (“Many home buyers say they were misled or didn’t 
understand the terms of their loans, particularly the ‘exploding ARMs’ that adjusted to stratospheric 
rates after a low introductory period.”); Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House 
Values and Mortgage Terms? 2 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2006-03, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899152 (“[A] sizeable number of adjustable-
rate borrowers report that they do not know the terms of their contracts.”); Statement of Karen 
Brown, Home Def. Program, Atl. Legal Aid Soc’y, Public Hearing Re: Building Sustainable 
Homeownership: Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer Choice 201–02 ( July 11, 2006), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060711/transcript 
.pdf (describing how a borrower with credit score considered prime was given adjustable-rate 
mortgage she thought was fixed and payments increased to $215 while her monthly income was 
$541); Lisa Prevost, The Fallout of Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/realestate/15wczo.html?ex=1342152000&en=51502d66d5337e7d
&ei=5088 (“A ‘staggering number’ of homeowners who are reaching out to the Consumer Law 
Group, a law firm in Rocky Hill, Conn., for help in avoiding foreclosure don’t understand their loans’ 
terms, said Daniel Blinn, managing attorney at the firm.”). 
14. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012). 
15. See id. § 1601. 
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition 
among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of 
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use 
of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of 
this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will 
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit . . . . 
Commentators have identified many other goals for TILA. For a list of some three dozen such 
disclosure goals, see Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in 
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 114 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. 
Staten eds., 2002). 
16. The survey is discussed more fully in Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through 
Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
761, 779–86 (2010), on which much of this discussion of TILA is based. 
17. At the time the survey was conducted, TILA, as implemented by Regulation Z, mandated 
that the disclosures be provided no later than at consummation (i.e., the point at which the consumer 
was contractually obliged on the loan). See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a)(13), 226.17(b) (2014); Truth in 
Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,591 ( July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). Under the 
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are the only disclosures that are required to contain the actual loan terms.18 
According to the responding brokers—who collectively conducted at least 58,125 
closings—borrowers almost never withdrew from a loan after reading the final 
disclosures at the closing and never used the final disclosures for comparison 
shopping. Thus, the TILA disclosures failed to accomplish one of their principal 
goals: facilitation of comparison shopping.19 
But there is more. Borrowers also spent very little time with the disclosures.20 
Just over half of the brokers reported that less than ten percent of their borrowers 
spent more than a minute with the disclosures.21 An additional group stated that 
between ten and twenty-nine percent of their customers devoted more than a 
minute to the disclosures.22 So more than two-thirds of the brokers reported that 
less than thirty percent of their borrowers spent more than a minute with the 
disclosures.23 
To make matters worse, when consumers had questions about the TILA 
disclosure forms, those questions tended not to deal with whether consumers 
were obtaining the best possible deal, but rather, matters that those familiar with 
TILA disclosures would be unlikely to ask about. Many brokers reported that 
borrowers often asked at the closing why the TILA Annual Percentage Rate 
(APR) disclosure was higher than the interest rate they had been led to expect.24 
Borrowers also expressed surprise about the size of the “Total of Payments”—
that is, the amount consumers could expect to pay over the life of the loan.25 
Consumers who spend time on those issues and spend a minute—or less—on the 
disclosures are probably not exploring whether they could have obtained better 
terms elsewhere. 
If consumers choose not to use the TILA disclosures, those disclosures can’t 
fulfill the lawmakers’ goal of helping consumers comparison shop for loan 
terms.26 The result is that TILA provides only the illusion of consumer protection. 
 
Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act, which became effective July 30, 2009, borrowers are to 
receive the final disclosures at least three days before the closing. Mortgage Disclosure Improvement 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2855. 
18. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,594. 
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
20. See BAREFOOT, MARRINAN & ASSOC., INC. & ANJAN V. THAKOR, COMMON GROUND: 
INCREASING CONSUMER BENEFITS AND REDUCING REGULATORY COSTS IN BANKING 6, 25 
(1993) (“Our research indicates that [bank] disclosures are not even read by large numbers of 
customers, and are understood by very few. . . . [B]ased upon observations from the bankers who 
furnish [bank] disclosures, most [consumers] do not even attempt to read them, but rather, drop them 
in the bank’s recycling bin on the way out the door.”). 
21. See Sovern, supra note 16, at 783. 
22. Id. at 784. 
23. Id. 
24. See id. at 785. 
25. See id. 
26. See George R. Milne et al., A Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 238, 238 (2006) (“For disclosures to be useful . . . consumers need to be 
motivated to read the disclosure, and they must have the ability to comprehend its content.”). 
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The second part of the answer to how the TILA disclosure statement failed 
to help borrowers understand their borrowing costs lies in problems with the 
disclosures themselves. For many borrowers, the disclosures were unintelligible; 
for those with adjustable rate mortgages—which made up about eighty percent of 
the subprime loans that led to the Great Recession—the disclosures were 
affirmatively misleading.27 Disclosures for adjustable rate loans suffer from an 
inherent problem. TILA obliges mortgage originators to disclose the monthly 
payments and interest rates for such loans,28 but because those and other 
mandated disclosures depend on future events, they cannot be known in advance. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve, which was charged until 2011 with 
interpreting TILA, made a poor decision about how to deal with this problem. 
The Federal Reserve did not instruct originators to note in the TILA disclosure 
forms that the numbers could not be predicted with certainty, or to include 
ceilings for future monthly payments. Instead, the Federal Reserve directed 
lenders preparing disclosure statements to state disclosures as if interest rates 
would remain what they were on the date the loan was issued for the entire life of 
the loan—often thirty years.29 Put another way, a system devised to cope with 
interest rates’ fluctuations would convey to consumers precisely the opposite: that 
interest rates would remain unchanged for the life of the loan. If interest rates 
rose, as could be expected at some time during a thirty-year period, the consumer 
could be obliged to pay considerably more than the disclosure statement indicated. 
Because consumers do not benefit from a disclosure statement that reports 
inaccurately what they will owe or the interest rate they will pay, and that also fails 
to note that the amounts so reported may be incorrect, the rule requiring such a 
 
27. See Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 
27, 30 (“The overwhelming majority—over 75 percent—of subprime mortgages that originated over 
the 2003–2007 period were so-called ‘short-term hybrids’ . . . .”); Statement of Hilary Shelton, On 
Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing 
Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Feb. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=9cc88a69 
-7757-4988-ae9b-ecad5f7bae99 (“[O]ver 80% of home loans made in the subprime market today are 
adjustable rate mortgage (ARMs) loans and the so-called ‘2/28’ or ‘3/27’ mortgages are the dominant 
product.”); Mara Lee, Subprime Mortgages: A Primer, NPR (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.npr.org 
/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9085408 (“The vast majority [of subprime loans]—about 80 
percent—have adjustable-rate mortgages, or ARMs, says Susan Wachter, a professor at the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School who specializes in real estate.”). According to the Federal Reserve, 
“[a]pproximately three-quarters of securitized originations in subprime pools from 2003 to 2007 were 
2-28 or 3-27 ARMs.” Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,540 ( July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.18 (2014). 
29. The TILA commentary, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 226. supp. I, subpt. A(8) (2012), states: 
Basis of disclosures in variable-rate transactions. The disclosures for a variable rate transaction 
must be given for the full term of the transaction and must be based on the terms in effect 
at the time of consummation. Creditors should base the disclosures only on the initial rate 
and should not assume that this rate will increase. For example, in a loan with an initial rate 
of 10 percent and a 5 percentage points rate cap, creditors should base the disclosures on 
the initial rate and should not assume that this rate will increase 5 percentage points. 
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disclosure would surely have flunked a cost-benefit analysis.30 Accordingly, an 
attempt to perform cost-benefit analysis, or even assess only the form’s benefits, 
might have led to a different rule. 
Even consumers who received fixed-rate mortgages may have been confused 
by the forms. In 2007, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff displayed the 
disclosure forms to consumers who had recently obtained mortgages.31 The FTC 
staff reported that the disclosures failed to convey key mortgage costs to many 
consumers and that about one-fifth of the respondents, while looking at the 
current disclosure forms, “could not correctly identify the APR of the loan, the 
amount of cash due at closing, or the monthly payment.”32 
But there is reason for hope because the rules have changed since the advent 
of the Great Recession. First, Congress enacted the Mortgage Disclosure 
Improvement Act, which took effect July 30, 2009, and made two relevant 
changes in mortgage disclosure rules.33 One of these changes advanced the time at 
which consumers receive the final terms of their mortgages from the closing to at 
least three days before the closing.34 The other change directed the Federal 
Reserve to issue a regulation that would require the disclosures to state the highest 
monthly payment the borrower might owe during the life of the loan.35 The 
resulting regulation directs mortgage originators to disclose the largest monthly 
payment the consumer might owe during both the first five years of the loan and 
the entire term of the loan, thus curing the problem with the earlier misleading 
disclosures about adjustable rate loans—if consumers heed the new disclosures.36 
Congress acted again in 2010 when it passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) and created the 
CFPB.37 The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Bureau to combine the TILA 
disclosures with another set of disclosures mandated by the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA),38 and in 2013, the Bureau promulgated a rule to do so, 
 
30. Another irony is that the cost of this particular rule would have been trivial. But because 
the benefits were negative, even zero cost would have exceeded the benefits of the federal 
government’s interpretation.   
31. See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING 
CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND 
PROTOTYPE MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE FORMS, at ES-6, ES-11–12 (2007), available at http://www 
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-consumer-mortgage-disclosures-empirical 
-assessment-current-and-prototype-disclosure-forms/p025505mortgagedisclosureexecutivesummary.pdf. 
32. Id. at ES-6–7. 
33. Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2855. 
34. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1026.19(a)(2)(ii) (2014). 
35. Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act § 2502(a)(6).  
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.18(s)(2).  
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
38. See id. 
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to take effect in 2015.39 Before doing so, the Bureau retained a contractor to 
conduct ten rounds of qualitative testing on various versions of the disclosures to 
see if consumers could understand them,40 and the contractor also performed 
quantitative tests.41 The Bureau also solicited and received more than 27,000 
comments during the testing phase,42 and received nearly 3000 more comments 
after proposing the rule.43 
The stated purposes of the consumer testing were to determine if consumers 
could understand the disclosures, compare disclosures for two or more loans, and 
make informed decisions.44 This increased attention to whether consumers 
understand the disclosures is laudable. But in all this testing, the Bureau did not 
verify that consumers would actually use the disclosures. Those who want to learn 
the terms of their loans from the disclosure forms should have an easier time 
doing so under the CFPB’s forms, but the forms will not benefit consumers if 
consumers persist in ignoring them. And if no one uses the forms, it is hard to see 
how they provide much consumer protection—or how they will prevent defaults 
and foreclosures in the future. 
In the absence of a test of whether consumers will use the forms, all we have 
is conjecture about what, if anything, consumers will do with them. One reason 
borrowers might use them is that the forms are more visually appealing than their 
predecessors. Weighing against that strength, however, is the forms’ length. The 
estimate forms, for example, are three pages long and contain dozens of 
disclosures.45 The final disclosures, which again are the only forms that contain 
the actual loan terms (unless the consumer locks in a rate), run five pages.46 That 
 
39. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730 (Dec. 31, 2013) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024, 1026) [hereinafter Integrated Mortgage Disclosures]. 
40. See KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., INC., KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA DISCLOSURES 9–10, 37, (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance 
.gov/f/201207_cfpb_report_tila-respa-testing.pdf. 
41. See KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., INC., KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: QUANTITATIVE 
STUDY OF THE CURRENT AND INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA DISCLOSURES (2013). 
42. Integrated Mortgage Disclosures, supra note 39. 
43. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) 
and Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov 
/#!docketDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0028 (last visited July 20, 2014) (2982 comments received). 
44. See KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., INC., supra note 40, at 4–5: 
[T]he CFPB’s Mortgage Disclosure Project had three objectives: 
[1] Comprehension. The disclosures should enable consumers to understand the basic 
terms of a loan and its costs, both immediate and over time. 
[2] Comparison. The disclosures should enable consumers to compare one Loan Estimate 
to another and identify the differences. The disclosures should also enable consumers to 
compare the Loan Estimate to the Closing Disclosure to identify differences between the 
two and understand or ask about the reasons for those differences. 
[3] Choice. Both comprehension and comparison should enable consumers to make 
informed decisions. For the Loan Estimate, consumers should be able to decide on the 
best loan for their personal situation. For the Closing Disclosure, they should be able to 
decide whether to close on the loan after reviewing the final terms and costs.  
45. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures, supra note 39. 
46. See id. 
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is a lot of information for consumers to take in, even as to one loan, but 
consumers who use the forms to comparison shop must compare an equal 
number of disclosures for each loan they consider. If consumers continue to give 
the forms only a minute or less of their attention, it is not clear how much of that 
information they will absorb. Ironically, TILA’s original version was seen as 
containing so many disclosures that consumers suffered from information 
overload and disregarded the disclosures.47 And yet, TILA at that time required 
only thirty-six disclosures, far fewer than the CFPB’s forms.48 Congress responded 
to that perceived excess by enacting the Truth in Lending Simplification and 
Reform Act to reduce the number of disclosures.49 The Bureau’s rule risks 
repeating and even exacerbating Congress’s original error (though to be fair, it is 
hard to see how the TILA and RESPA disclosures can be combined without 
risking information overload). Without testing, we simply cannot tell whether 
consumers would use the disclosure forms, and so we cannot tell whether they 
will benefit consumers. 
Nor do we know if the change in the disclosure schedule has affected how 
consumers use the forms. Though borrowers now must receive the final 
disclosures at least three days before closing,50 it remains unclear whether 
consumers comparison shop at that point or are willing to withdraw from loans 
carrying unsatisfactory terms. Perhaps some borrowers upon receiving the 
disclosures in the days before closing will discover that the terms are not to their 
liking and will back out of the loan. Homeowners refinancing an existing 
mortgage who have little to lose by delaying the refinancing might so act. But it is 
harder to imagine a consumer facing the loss of his or her dream house and 
possibly also a hefty deposit walking away from a loan only days before the 
closing, especially since many consumers are undoubtedly psychologically 
committed at that late stage.51 Yet lenders are not required to provide the final 
loan terms any earlier than three days before closing. 
The new rules seem to be an improvement, but if consumers persist in not 
taking advantage of the disclosures, the result could again be illusory consumer 
 
47. See S. REP. No. 96-3, at 2–3 (1979), available at 1979 WL 10376 (“There is considerable 
evidence, for example, that disclosure forms given consumers are too lengthy and difficult to 
understand . . . . [T]he Consumer Affairs Subcommittee heard testimony from a leading psychologist 
who has studied the problem of ‘information overload.’ The Subcommittee learned that judging from 
consumer tests in other areas, the typical disclosure statement utilized today by creditors is not an 
effective communication device. Most disclosure statements are lengthy . . . . The Committee has 
adopted . . . suggestions to simplify the typical Truth in Lending disclosure statement. The number of 
disclosures given the consumer would be reduced . . . .”). 
48. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (2014); Truth in Lending, 34 Fed. Reg. 2002 (Feb. 11, 1969) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
49. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
50. See Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2855. 
51. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 351–52 (2005) 
(stating that on the day of the loan closing “a borrower has psychologically committed herself to the 
loan”).  
           
1252 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1241 
protection, and the cost could be the failure to adopt more effective consumer 
protection measures. Surely it would be preferable to discover if consumers will 
use the new forms through consumer testing rather than through another Great 
Recession.52 If such testing reveals that consumers give the forms too little 
attention for them to be effective, the Bureau should adopt something else or 
recommend to Congress that it enact better consumer protections.53 
B. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975 
Among Congress’s goals when it enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
of 197554 was “to make warranties on consumer products more readily 
understood.”55 Just as TILA sought to improve the functioning of the consumer 
loan market, Magnuson-Moss attempted to improve the functioning of the 
consumer warranty market.56 One way Congress sought to accomplish that goal 
was by requiring providers of consumer goods carrying written warranties to label 
their warranties either “full” or “limited.”57 Thus, consumers who wanted greater 
warranty protection could seek full warranties, while those unwilling to pay for the 
greater protection could settle for limited warranties. 
But in fact, consumers seem largely unaware of the difference between full 
and limited warranties. For example, in one study, recent purchasers of new cars 
were asked whether their cars’ warranties were full or limited.58 Some forty-three 
percent replied that their cars had full warranties; in fact, none did.59 And another 
survey of consumers “revealed widespread ignorance about the legal difference 
between full and limited warranties. . . . [R]espondents in the study were 
effectively unaware of the differences prescribed for full and limited warranties 
and their rights under the law.”60 To make matters worse, according to another 
 
52. See BAREFOOT, MARRINAN & ASSOC. & THAKOR, supra note 20, at 51 (“In the banking 
disclosure rules, the whole point is to give customers information they can put to use. Accordingly, 
the core issue should be to determine what information is actually most useful to people. This is a 
question to which consumer research can make a great contribution . . . .”). 
53. I made some suggestions for alternative consumer protections in Sovern, supra note 16, at 
783. 
54. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012).  
55. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 20 (1974). The Committee Report also quoted a 1968 
Report by the Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service that “[t]here is substantial evidence 
that at the time of the sale the purchaser of a major appliance does not understand the nature and 
extent of the protection provided by the manufacturer’s warranty or of the obligations under the 
warranty of the manufacturer or of the retailer.” Id. at 27–28. 
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2012) (stating, “In order to improve the adequacy of information 
available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer 
products . . . .”). 
57. See id. 
58. See F. Kelly Shuptrine, Warranty Coverage: How Important in Purchasing an Automobile?, in 
MARKETING: FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHANGING WORLD 300, 301 (Brian T. Engelland & Denise T. 
Smart eds., 1995). 
59. See id. at 304. 
60. Robert E. Wilkes & James B. Wilcox, Limited Versus Full Warranties: The Retail Perspective, 57 
J. RETAILING 65, 75–76 (1981). The study did find that “consumers react negatively to a product with 
           
2014] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  1253 
study, “the average consumer who purchases a product is not able to understand 
or comprehend the meaning of expressed warranties.”61 
If consumers don’t know the difference between full and limited warranties, 
then they cannot value the different types of warranties correctly, and so they 
cannot make an informed decision about whether they are willing to pay more for 
the extra protection a full warranty provides. While the authors of the Magnuson-
Moss Act undoubtedly had good intentions, they failed to give sufficient attention 
to whether consumers would use their warranty classification system. The result is 
that for nearly forty years consumer products have borne labels that consumers 
cannot accurately interpret and appear not to use. It is hard to find a benefit in 
that. And manufacturers seem to be aware that consumers ignore the rule, because 
the available evidence suggests few offer full warranties—which makes sense 
because if consumers don’t know what full warranties are, they may not be willing 
to pay extra for them, and manufacturers may be reluctant to incur the extra costs 
of providing them.62 In other words, the statute has failed in its goal of informing 
consumers and stimulating warranty competition. Once again, a consumer 
protection that depends upon consumers for its effectiveness has seemingly 
stumbled. In the meantime, Congress has not enacted an alternate system that 
might have enabled the warranty marketplace to function better. 
 
a limited warranty even if they do not understand what the word ‘limited’ really means.” Id. at 76. 
Whether that is still true is unclear.  
61. F. Kelly Shuptrine & Ellen M. Moore, Even After the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975, Warranties 
Are Not Easy to Understand, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF. 394, 403 (1980); see also Ellen M. Moore & F. Kelly 
Shuptrine, Warranties: Continued Readability Problems After the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 27 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 23, 29 (1993) (“All waranties [sic] examined in this study clearly would not be easy 
to read or understand by the 50 percent of the American adult population unable to read at an eighth-
grade level.”); Michael J. Wisdom, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. 
REV. 1117, 1144 (1979) (“[W]arranties are no easier to read than before passage of the Act.”). 
62. Little empirical evidence bears on how common full warranties are. A twenty-year-old 
study found less than one-third of the 105 warranties examined to be full. See Moore & Shuptrine, 
supra note 61, at 30. A few sources have noted that full warranties are less prevalent than limited 
warranties, see What is a Full Warranty?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-full-
warranty.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) (“In general, limited warranties are more frequently offered 
by manufacturers than full warranties.”); What Is the Difference Between a Full Warranty and a Limited 
Warranty?, FINDLAW, http://consumer.findlaw.com/consumer-transactions/difference-between-a 
-full-warranty-and-a-limited-warranty.html#sthash.KXodvN8S.dpuf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) 
(“Limited warranties are substantially more common [than full warranties].”), but it is not clear what 
these observations are based on. Consequently, I asked a research assistant, Eric Levine, to visit a 
store selling warranted consumer products to see how many had full warranties and how many 
limited. Of the twenty items he checked, seventeen carried limited warranties. The remaining three 
warranties were not labeled either full or limited; apparently their manufacturers were violating the 
Magnuson-Moss Act. None bore a full warranty. This is obviously only a tiny study conducted at one 
store, but when the tally for “not in compliance with the law” exceeds the number of items with full 
warranties, one may fairly wonder what the requirement that warranties be labeled either full or 
limited is accomplishing. The paucity of full warranties contrasts with the goals of at least one 
sponsor of the Magnuson–Moss Act. See 119 CONG. REC. 972, 973 (1973) (statement of Sen. Moss) 
(“This bill would encourage more manufacturers to issue ‘full’ warranties . . . .”). 
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C. Cooling-Off Periods 
Many federal and state laws provide that consumers must be given three days 
to rescind certain transactions.63 For example, federal law requires that cooling-off 
periods be provided in certain student loans,64 mortgages and home-equity loans,65 
and door-to-door sales,66 while state laws oblige businesses to give consumers a 
right to rescind in telemarketing sales, gym memberships, and dance lesson 
contracts.67 Proponents of cooling-off periods argue that they enable consumers 
to reconsider a purchase after being subjected to a “hard sell,”68 buying something 
on impulse,69 or after finding a better deal.70 Yet not only has no study ever shown 
 
63. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-89-108 (West, Westlaw through 2d Extraordinary Sess.) 
(door-to-door sales); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.85 (West 2009) (health studio services); D.C. CODE 
§ 28-3811 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 22, 2014) (door-to-door sales); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-640 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (door-to-door sales); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2444.2 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (hearing aids); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 48 (West 
2006) (door-to-door sales); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.710 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(door-to-door sales); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-504 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.) (door-to-
door sales); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-b (McKinney 2012) (dance-instruction contracts); N.Y. PERS. 
PROP. LAW § 425 (McKinney 2013) (door-to-door sales); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 440–448 (2013) 
(telemarketing); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25A-39 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (door-to-
door sales); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.43 (West, Westlaw through Files 1–140 & Statewide 
Issue 1 of the 130th General Assemb.) (prepaid entertainment contracts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, 
§ 2-502 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.) (door-to-door sales); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
502 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (door-to-door sales); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 33-25A-14 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (health-maintenance-organization contracts). 
64. See Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,194 (Aug. 14, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
226). 
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (2014). 
66. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2014). 
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 90-1417, at 1 (1968) (“The Consumer Sales Protection Act is designed 
to provide a consumer with some meaningful and readily available relief once he has succumbed to a 
high pressure sales pitch of a door-to-door salesman, but has subsequently had time to mull over the 
transaction and realize that he has made an unwanted purchase, paid an unconscionable price, or 
unnecessarily burdened his family with a major long-term expenditure.”); In Re Public Hearing on 
Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Concerning a Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales Before 
the Federal Trade Commission, 38 (F.T.C. 1971) (testimony of Sen. Frank E. Moss, Chairman, 
Consumer Subcomm.) (“[Cooling-off periods] also reduce[ ] the reliance the salesman may place on 
high-pressure tactics. For when the decision to buy must make as much sense to the consumer after 
mature reflection as it did during an energetic sales pitch, there will be no purpose served by a high-
pressure tactic designed to make the consumer sign before he can think about it.”). 
69. See, e.g., Door-to-Door Sales Act: Hearing on S. 1599 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 90th Cong. 44 (1968) (statement of David Caplovitz, Professor, Columbia University) 
(“Door-to-door selling reduces [the] deliberative process to a minimum at the same time that it 
maximizes what has been called ‘impulse buying.’ It is quite one thing to buy an inexpensive trinket 
on impulse, and quite another to assume a debt of several hundred dollars or more in this way.”); 
William G. Meserve, The Proposed Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act: An Examination of Its Effectiveness as a 
Consumer Remedy and the Constitutional Validity of Its Enforcement Provisions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1171, 
1186 (1969) (“When a purchase has been made on impulse, ‘buyer’s remorse’ will undoubtedly set in 
after the salesman has left and may result in a cancellation.” (footnote omitted)). 
70. See, e.g., Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Its Basis and Purpose, 
37 Fed. Reg. 22,934, 22,939 (Oct. 26, 1972) (“Excessive prices for products sold in the home are 
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that consumers use cooling-off periods in significant numbers, but in addition, 
several studies have raised serious questions about whether consumers use such 
rescission rights. 
In 2010, I had research assistants call businesses subject to cooling-off 
periods to determine the extent to which consumers invoked their right to 
rescind.71 More than one-third (thirty-five percent) of the respondents who 
answered questions reported that buyers never cancel within three days.72 Another 
twenty-nine percent claimed that fewer than one percent of the buyers cancelled 
within three days, while eight percent indicated that at least one percent, but no 
more than two percent, of the buyers rescinded within three days.73 In other 
words, nearly three-quarters of the respondents stated that two percent or fewer 
of their customers cancelled within three days. It is hard to see how cooling-off 
periods protect consumers from hard sells or impulse purchases when consumers 
seemingly use them so rarely. 
Other studies have been no more encouraging about the effectiveness of 
cooling-off periods. An early study of a one-day cooling-off period in Connecticut 
found that the right to rescind “benefits consumers very little.”74 And two studies 
commissioned by the Federal Trade Commission in 1981 to evaluate the 
Commission’s Door-to-Door Cooling-Off Period Rule (the FTC Rule) support 
similar conclusions. Of the more than 1400 consumers queried in one survey, not 
one had invoked the FTC Rule to rescind a purchase, although the fact that few 
were dissatisfied with their purchases undoubtedly contributed to that outcome.75 
Similarly, a survey of businesses subject to the FTC Rule found that only two 
percent believed that the FTC Rule had increased the number of cancellations 
their company experienced.76 
While it remains unclear whether cooling-off periods are in fact aimed at a 
real problem, if such a problem exists, it seems unlikely that cooling-off periods 
can solve it if consumers do not invoke them. And that, in turn, suggests that 
lawmakers who believe that a problem exists should long ago have considered an 
alternative to a remedy that provides such a meager benefit. 
 
commonplace . . . . Since the sale is being made in the home, the consumer is unable to ascertain the 
price of similar or substitute products as he could do if he visited several retail establishments.”).  
71. See Jeff Sovern, Written Notice of Cooling-Off Periods: A Forty-Year Natural Experiment in Illusory 
Consumer Protection and the Relative Effectiveness of Oral and Written Disclosures, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 17–23), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2103807 (reporting survey results from businesses regarding implementation and utility 
of cooling-off periods). 
72. Id. at 18. 
73. Id. 
74. Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the 
Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 628 (1969). 
75. See GLENN E. DAVIS, PUB. SECTOR RESEARCH GRP., FINAL REPORT OF AN IMPACT 
EVALUATION OF THE COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR DOOR-TO-DOOR SALES TRADE RULE, at I-5 
(1981). 
76. See WALKER RESEARCH, INC., THREE-DAY COOLING-OFF PERIOD TRADE RULE 
EVALUATION STUDY 16 (1981). 
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D. Financial Privacy Notices 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), which 
obliges financial institutions to notify their customers—depositors, credit card 
customers, and the like—of their information-sharing policies annually and 
describe customers’ rights to opt out of the transfer of some of that information.77 
The result has been called “a blizzard of notices.”78 Yet early reports indicated that 
few consumers had opted out, although available evidence about opt-outs is 
sparse. Thus, an America’s Community Banker Survey found that sixty percent of 
financial institutions stated that less than one percent of consumers opted out;79 
the American Banker, a trade publication, reported that five percent of consumers 
had opted out;80 and the Financial Services Coordinating Council claimed that the 
percent of consumers opting out was “low, and in nearly all cases under 10 
percent.”81 
Conceivably, opt-out rates are higher now. In 2009, regulators produced 
model forms, which seemingly are easier to read than the forms the financial 
institutions created and so might generate more opt-outs.82 The opt-out figures 
provided above preceded the model form, although even at that time, financial 
institutions could find aid in sample clauses included in the implementing 
regulations.83 While not all financial institutions have abandoned their own forms 
in favor of the model form, the model form functions as a safe harbor in that 
institutions using it are deemed in compliance with GLB and so have an incentive 
to employ it.84 
One reason the model form might generate higher opt-out rates is that, like 
the CFPB’s mortgage forms, its design was the subject of extensive consumer 
 
77. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
78. See Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Economics of Financial Privacy: To Opt Out or Opt In?, ECON. Q., 
Summer 2002, at 1, 2; Timothy J. Muris, Former Fed. Trade Comm’n Chairman, Remarks at the 
Privacy 2001 Conference: Protecting Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/10/protecting-consumers-privacy-2002-and-beyond 
(“The recent experience with Gramm-Leach-Bliley privacy notices should give everyone pause about 
whether we know enough to implement effectively broad-based legislation based on notices. Acres of 
trees died to produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy notices.”).  
79. Privacy Compliance Survey, America’s Cmty. Bankers, WASH. PERSP. SUPPLEMENT (Dec. 
3, 2001) (on file with author).  
80. W.A. Lee, Opt-Out Notices Give No One A Thrill, AM. BANKER, July 10, 2001, at 1.  
81. Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of John C. Dugan, Partner, Covington & Burling 
LLP, Financial Services Coordinating Council). Mr. Dugan later served as the Comptroller of the 
Currency, which was at that time responsible for enforcing GLB. See MARK FURLETTI & STEPHEN 
SMITH, FINANCIAL PRIVACY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PAYMENT CARDS INDUSTRY 10 (2003) 
(finding that “less than 5 percent of [a card] issuer’s customers typically opt out of affiliate-sharing 
efforts”). 
82. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 313, app. A (2014).  
83. The model clauses appeared in earlier versions of 16 C.F.R. pt. 313, app. A. 
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(e)(4) (2012). Financial institutions that use their own forms will still 
be in compliance with GLB if their form meets the GLB requirements. 
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testing, this time by two different firms.85 But just as with the mortgage forms, the 
testing was intended to determine whether consumers who wished to could 
understand the form, rather than whether consumers would actually use the 
form.86 Consequently, the extent to which consumers use the form remains 
unclear. 
Perhaps a better way to measure the effectiveness of the notices focuses on 
awareness of the forms rather than the opt-out rate. The use of the opt-out rate as 
a measure of efficacy assumes that consumers will want to opt out, when in fact it 
may be that opt-out rates are low because consumers read the forms and decide 
against protecting their privacy. Some evidence does indeed suggest that 
consumers have greater awareness of the privacy forms than the low opt-out rates 
imply. A University of Michigan survey of 500 adults, conducted a few years after 
GLB became effective, but before the model forms were available, found that 
seventy-three percent recalled receiving privacy policies from their financial 
institutions; when asked what they did with the forms, fifty-nine percent said they 
opened the forms and glanced at them, while thirty percent reported they gave the 
forms more than just a glance.87 Less than ten percent of the respondents stated 
they threw the forms away.88 It is unclear how accurate the survey responses are; 
perhaps the act of asking consumers if they remembered the forms caused them 
to think they remembered them.89 
 
85. See KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., EVOLUTION OF A PROTOTYPE FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
NOTICE 2–4 (2006) [hereinafter KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., EVOLUTION OF A PROTOTYPE]; 
KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICE: A REPORT ON VALIDATION TESTING 
RESULTS 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter, KLEIMANN, FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICE]; MACRO INT’L, INC., 
MALL INTERCEPT STUDY OF CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICES: 
METHODOLOGICAL REPORT 1–4 (2008); see also Loretta Garrison et al., Designing Evidence-Based 
Disclosures: A Case Study of Financial Privacy Notices, 46 J. CONSUMER AFF. 204, 209–11 (2012) (using 
consumer testing to develop evidence-based disclosures). Web-based notices were also subject to 
testing, see KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., WEB-BASED FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICE FINAL 
SUMMARY FINDINGS REPORT 5–6 (2009), but again the focus was on such things as whether 
consumers could understand the web forms rather than whether they would use them. Id. 
86. See MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 85, at 6–16 (including an Appendix A of questions 
posed to consumers, none of which pertains to whether consumers will use the forms). Similarly, 
KLEIMANN, EVOLUTION OF A PROTOTYPE, supra note 85, at 2, states as its goals: 
[1] Comprehension. The prototype must enable customers to understand the basic 
concepts behind the privacy notices and understand what to do with the notices. It must 
be clear and conspicuous as a whole and readily accessible in its parts.  
[2] Comparison. The prototype must allow consumers to compare information sharing 
practices across financial institutions and to identify the differences in sharing practices. 
[3] Compliance. The content and design of the alternative privacy notices must include the 
elements required by the GLBA and the affiliate marketing provision of the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act. 
87. See UNIV. OF MICH., SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., SURVEYS OF CONSUMERS (2004) (on file 
with author); Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n., ABA Survey Shows Nearly Two Out of Three 
Consumers Read Their Privacy Notices ( June 7, 2001) (on file with author).  
88. See Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n., supra note 87. 
89. Another issue raised by privacy survey data is that when it comes to privacy, consumers 
“do not do what they say, and they do not know what they claim to know . . . . [The consumers’] 
behavior did not match their survey statements.” Carlos Jensen et al., Privacy Practices of Internet Users: 
Self-Reports Versus Observed Behavior, 63 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 203, 224 (2005). 
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While the Michigan survey suggests consumer awareness of the forms, other 
findings raise doubts about whether consumers actually used the forms. Survey 
data suggests that more consumers are interested in protecting their privacy than 
have in fact opted out.90 Indeed, two-thirds of the respondents to the Michigan 
survey reported that they would be very likely to transfer their account to another 
financial institution if they believed their primary financial institution did not 
protect their personal financial information adequately—far more than appear to 
have opted out of the transfer of their financial information, a less onerous act 
than transferring accounts.91 While the surveys may overstate consumers’ interest 
in protecting their privacy, it is also plausible that the burden of noticing the 
forms, reading and understanding them, and then acting on the information, is 
 
90. The University of Michigan survey asked: “How important is it to you that your (family’s) 
primary financial institution protects the personal information about your (family’s) account or 
accounts?” UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 87, at 4. Of those responding, eighty-seven percent said it was 
very important, and nine percent said it was somewhat important. Id. at 4. Less than two percent said 
it was either not very important or not at all important. Id.; see also Statement of Richard Holober, 
Exec. Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Cal., Financial Privacy Initiative Press Conference (Mar. 11, 2003), 
available at http://www.consumercal.org/article.php?id=245 (noting sixty-seven percent of California 
voters surveyed rated financial privacy a “major or important concern”); Rob Schneider, Financial 
Privacy, CONSUMERS UNION 1 ( Jan. 2003), http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2013 
/04/FinPrivacy.pdf (“In poll after poll, Americans say that protecting their personal privacy is of 
great concern to them.”). Respondents to the University of Michigan Survey also seemed to believe 
that their financial institutions did protect their information. UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 87, at 5. 
Thus, fifty-nine percent thought their primary financial institution protected financial information 
about them or their family very well, and another thirty-one percent believed their financial institution 
protected their financial information somewhat well. See id. Perhaps consumers do not opt out 
because they believe their financial institution is not selling their information. That raises questions 
about how many financial institutions do in fact share customer information, something that is 
difficult to determine. An America’s Community Bankers survey stated that about half the financial 
institutions with assets exceeding $1 billion provided customer information to nonaffiliated third 
parties while the “great majority” of smaller institutions did not do so. Privacy Compliance Survey, 
supra note 79. But as that information was collected in 2001, it is unclear whether it remains true 
today. A more recent study found that about a quarter of financial institutions sampled reported 
sharing with affiliates and only seven percent reported sharing with nonaffiliates, but the sample was 
largely confined to financial institutions using the model form or that were among the largest 100 
banks, and so may not be representative of financial institutions generally. See LORRIE FAITH 
CRANOR ET AL., ARE THEY ACTUALLY ANY DIFFERENT? COMPARING THOUSANDS OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS’ PRIVACY PRACTICES 5–6 (2013), available at http://weis2013.econinfosec.org 
/papers/CranorWEIS2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). Because institutions selling consumer 
information may wish to continue doing so, they have an incentive to eschew the model form and use 
their own less clear form to reduce consumer opt-outs. On the other hand, lenders that do not sell 
customer information have no reason to use a form that is harder to understand, and so may be more 
likely to use the model form. Thus, a study that draws disproportionately on financial institutions that 
use the model form may understate the number of banks selling consumer information. It thus seems 
plausible that many consumers believe incorrectly that their banks are not transferring information 
about their transactions to others, though it is impossible to be certain. 
91. See UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 87. Another eighteen percent reported that it was 
somewhat likely that they would transfer their account to another institution. Id. Less than twelve 
percent replied that it was somewhat or very unlikely that they would transfer their account. Id. 
Similarly, in choosing a financial institution, forty-eight percent stated that the privacy policy was very 
important and thirty-five percent reported that it was somewhat important. Id. 
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more than most consumers are willing to take on to protect their privacy.92 If 
more consumers are interested in protecting their privacy than are acting to 
protect it, that would suggest that GLB has failed to enable a significant number 
of consumers to protect their privacy, notwithstanding consumers’ desire to have 
it protected. Or, to put it another way, it appears that GLB did not create a system 
that many consumers who want to protect their privacy use. If it is the case that 
consumers want to protect their privacy, and society wishes to accommodate that 
desire, some other means must be found.93 
Alternatively, if few people wish to protect their privacy, that raises questions 
about just how valuable GLB is to consumers. A protection that only a tiny 
fraction of people use may not be worth having in that form. 
II. HOW TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CONSUMER  
PROTECTIONS WILL BE EFFECTIVE? 
The foregoing has argued that consumer protections that depend on 
consumers doing things consumers do not in fact do provide few benefits. That 
suggests that before lawmakers adopt consumer protection rules that depend on 
consumers to act, they should verify that consumers will play their part. This part 
addresses some strategies for accomplishing that. 
One way lawmakers can try to determine if consumers will use consumer 
protection rules is to use pilot projects. For example, one alternative to the 
disclosure regime established by TILA is to mandate counseling. Lawmakers 
could set up pilot projects to determine if credit counseling produces better 
outcomes than TILA. Chicago ran just such an experiment with positive results, 
although additional study is needed for confirmation.94 
 
92. According to the Michigan survey, when asked how confident they are that they 
understand the forms, seventy-two percent reported that they were either very or somewhat 
confident. Id. When asked about the usefulness of the privacy notices, two-thirds called them either 
very or somewhat useful, suggesting that they are able to navigate the forms. Id. 
93. Another example of a consumer protection that depends on consumers to act is the rule 
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act that entitles each consumer to obtain a free credit report once a year 
from each of the three major credit bureaus, Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax. See 15 U.S.C. 
1681j(a) (2012). Less than twenty percent of consumers take advantage of this right. See CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM: 
A REVIEW OF HOW THE NATION’S LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS MANAGE CONSUMER DATA 27 
(2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper 
.pdf. While that appears to be a higher response rate than is true of some of the protections described 
in this Article, it still means that more than eighty percent of consumers are not helped by that 
particular consumer protection. Nevertheless, the free annual credit report benefits the nearly twenty 
percent of Americans who take advantage of it. 
94. For example, one study found the counseling “helped borrowers better understand the 
costs and terms of their loans, leading to better-informed decision-making,” ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & 
PROF’L REGULATION, supra note 13, at 1 (2007), while another study reported “substantially lower ex 
post default rates and somewhat better loan choices among some of the counseled borrowers that 
remained in the market.” Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Financial Counseling Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice 
and Performance? Evidence from a Legislative Experiment 3, 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working 
Paper No. 07, 2009), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working 
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Another option is to borrow from Justice Brandeis’s familiar view of the 
states as laboratories of democracy.95 For example, some states require cooling-off 
periods for telemarketing sales while others do not.96 Those wishing to see 
whether cooling-off periods serve any useful purpose for telephone sales could 
compare the issues arising from telemarketing in two states with different 
approaches to see if the cooling-off period produces any benefits. 
But sometimes it simply is not possible to determine the effect of consumer 
protections before they are adopted. In such cases, it may be possible to evaluate 
them after they take effect, and come to conclusions about their efficacy after the 
fact. 
In evaluating rules, it is also important to understand that sometimes the rule 
may be ineffective in one form but effective in another. For example, it appears 
that the early GLB disclosures were not effective to protect consumer privacy,97 
but it is possible that the model form may work better. We won’t know until it is 
studied. Similarly, TILA was not able to prevent the Great Recession, but it is 
possible that better-designed disclosures might yet prove effective. On the other 
hand, if even the best possible disclosures are not enough, lawmakers must either 
accept that they are employing an ineffective consumer protection, or try another 
approach, such as consumer counseling. 
It may also be necessary to accept that some rules cannot be evaluated. The 
inability to determine whether a rule is effective should not by itself be enough to 
abandon the rule, but it is obviously not ideal. In such cases, it may be desirable to 
pair the consumer protection with another consumer protection that can be 
shown to be effective. 
III. A COMMENT ON THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY  
REGULATORY ANALYSIS ACT 
I have argued that proponents of consumer protections that depend on 
consumers to act to be effective should have to show that consumers will actually 
do what is necessary for the protections to work. Put another way, advocates 
should demonstrate that the protections will actually confer benefits. This is not 
to say, however, that they should be obliged to demonstrate in a rigorous way that 
the benefits of the intervention exceed the costs, or that regulators’ conclusions 
that a particular consumer protection can be justified by a cost-benefit analysis 
 
_papers/2009/wp2009_07.pdf (noting, however, that the positive results may have been attributed to 
factors other than counseling, such as “the threat of oversight and the imposition of transaction and 
compliance costs of counseling”). 
95. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 281 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
96. For an example of a cooling-off statute for telemarketing sales, see N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW 
§ 440 (McKinney 2013). For a list of such statutes and summaries of them, see DEE PRIDGEN & 
RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW app. 15A (2012–2013). 
97. See, e.g., Privacy Compliance Survey, supra note 79 (noting sixty percent of financial 
institutions report that less than one percent of customers opted out); Lee, supra note 80, at 2 
(reporting that five percent of consumers had opted out). 
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should be second-guessed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, all 
as contemplated by the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act.98 This 
section is intended to make clear that it is possible to support a requirement that, 
before consumer protections are created, advocates must demonstrate that 
consumers will take advantage of the protections, without at the same time calling 
for the troubling rules of the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act. 
Consumer protection agencies already use cost-benefit analysis to some 
degree. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act obliges the CFPB to “consider” costs 
and benefits when promulgating a rule.99 The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission is subject to a similar directive.100 The Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Economics is an institutionalized way to perform cost-benefit 
analysis,101 while the FTC’s definition of unfairness, codified by Congress as to 
the FTC and also carried forward into the Dodd-Frank Act to govern 
determinations of unfairness by the CFPB, is strongly flavored with economics: 
for the FTC to find conduct unfair, “the act or practice [must] cause[] or [be] 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable 
by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”102 
This seems like an appropriate way to handle the matching of costs to 
benefits. Consumer protection agencies are commanded to take cost-benefit 
analysis into account, but are not bound slavishly to it. They should attempt to 
 
98. The bill was originally introduced as S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012), and has been re-
introduced as S. 1173, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (2013); see also Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 23. 
The New York Times editorial board criticized the bill, finding that “[s]ubjecting independent agencies 
to executive regulatory review would not improve the rule-making process, but . . . would ensure that 
ostensibly regulated industries are as unregulated and deregulated as possible. Even the bill’s Senate 
proponents admit as much, though not intentionally.” Editorial, Reining In the Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2013, at A16. 
99. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2) (2012) (“In prescribing a rule under the Federal consumer 
financial laws—(A) the Bureau shall consider—(i) the potential benefits and costs to consumers and 
covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial 
products or services resulting from such rule . . . .”). 
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f ) (2012): 
(2) The Commission shall not promulgate a consumer product safety rule unless it has 
prepared, on the basis of the findings of the Commission under paragraph (1) and on other 
information before the Commission, a final regulatory analysis of the rule containing the 
following information: 
(A) A description of the potential benefits and potential costs of the rule, including costs 
and benefits that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those 
likely to receive the benefits and bear the costs. 
101. See Jonathan Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 874 (1997) (“[T]he FTC has created an organizational structure that helps it 
accomplish what cost-benefit analysis is intended to provide. By creating a large role for the Bureau of  
Economics—both in ongoing investigations and systematic evaluations of past regulatory efforts—
the FTC attempts to achieve better results with fewer burdens on private parties.”). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (codifying the Bureau’s counterpart); J. 
Howard Beales, III, Regulatory Analysis and the Independent Agencies, RFF.ORG 4 (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.rff.org/documents/events/workshops%20and%20conferences/110407_regulation 
_beales.pdf (describing test for unfairness as “[b]asically a cost benefit test”). 
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demonstrate that protections will have benefits, but should not necessarily be 
forced to quantify those benefits, because often the benefits cannot be quantified. 
For example, consider financial privacy. Some people don’t care about protecting 
the confidentiality of their financial transactions, and for them, it may be fair to 
value financial privacy at zero. Does that mean financial privacy should be valued 
at zero for everyone? Some consumers value their financial privacy enough to 
wade through their GLB forms and take the steps necessary to protect it. That 
indicates that they do value financial privacy, but does not answer the question of 
how much they value it, beyond the time needed to protect it. Still others may 
value their privacy, but have not responded to the GLB forms. Is that because 
they value their privacy less than the time they would expend in responding to the 
GLB forms, or does it mean only that they have not realized that the forms offer a 
way to protect their privacy and so have ignored them, thinking of them as junk 
mail? How can policymakers possibly quantify the value of financial privacy 
reliably under these circumstances? 
Then there are cooling-off periods. How much value should policymakers 
accord the right to rescind a contract? For consumers who choose not to rescind, 
is the right to rescind valueless, or do they derive some comfort from the 
knowledge (assuming they read the notice and possess that knowledge) that they 
can rescind if they want to?103 
Or suppose the CFPB is able to devise effective mortgage disclosure forms. 
Not only would they enable consumers to learn their payment obligations, they 
would help consumers make wiser choices. If consumer protection rules make 
markets work better, how is that to be valued?104 Similarly, if consumer protection 
rules reduce the number of foreclosures, how is that to be valued? Loan 
foreclosures damage borrowers, lenders, communities, and entire economies. 
Should we take into account the value of avoiding the next Great Recession? 
It is possible to imagine numbers that would purport to answer these 
questions, just as it was possible for the federal government to instruct mortgage 
originators to assume that interest rates would never change so that they could fill 
out the TILA disclosure forms. But the numbers policymakers could arrive at 
could be just as wrong as the numbers in the TILA forms, and if policymakers 
relied on them, they could be just as misled as consumers who relied on their 
TILA forms and later defaulted and were foreclosed upon. That seems pointless. 
We would be better off to require policymakers to demonstrate that consumers 
 
103. Cf. Craswell, supra note 7, at 350 (“[H]ow we value any improvement (or any decline) in 
the accuracy of consumers’ beliefs is a question that cannot be answered by mathematical calculations. 
Instead, it requires a fundamental value judgment about the importance of a better- or worse-
informed citizenry compared to the value of other uses to which the money might otherwise have 
been put.”). 
104. Cf. Baker, supra note 101, at 864 (“[K]eeping markets open and honest reduces the 
private transaction costs of participating in market exchanges and relationships, and thereby leads to 
greater economic growth.”). The Magnuson-Moss Act was also intended to make markets work 
better. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012). 
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will benefit from consumer protection rules, do their best to quantify costs and 
benefits, and leave it at that. 
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